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ABSTRACT 
Twenty years have passed since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and it is time 
to draw a concluding line for monetary policy efficiency in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). We propose a comprehensive treatment of the subject 
for nine members of the CIS for the period of 2000-2009. Four transmission 
channels are investigated: interest rate channel, exchange rate channel, bank 
lending channel, and monetary channel. First, we design a Vector Auto 
Regression framework for each CIS member-state and investigate the short-run 
dynamics of the impact of each of the four transmission channels on domestic 
output and inflation. Second, we construct Auto Regressive Distributed Lag 
Models (ARDL) in order to study the country-wise efficiency of transmission 
channels in the long run. Finally, we employ a panel data fixed effects method 
to show how the CIS behaves as a region. Our short-run individual country 
analysis yields highly heterogeneous results. In the long run, however, it’s 
apparent that broad monetary base (M2) is the most influential determinant of 
aggregate output. Inflation is affected the most by the refinancing rate and the 
flow of remittances. For both output and inflation, exchange rate plays a role of 
a supporting channel.
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Introduction
The Channels of Monetary Transmission: an Overview
The proposition that policy interventions can affect macroeconomic behavior has 
become a leading line of thought among both researchers and practitioners. It is said 
that policy-makers are able to influence the flow of events in the real economy by 
targeting specific economic aggregates of interest. They achieve this by calibrating 
certain policy variables – those over which they have direct power and control. An 
intervention into the policy variable then, in theory, transmits its innovation into 
the real economy via a certain channel. While policy interventions and end-of-the-
day effects on the real economy are largely known and measurable, the dynamic that 
occurs in the transmission channel is quite challenging to assess and to measure. The 
channels of monetary transmission are often called a “black box”, suggesting that we 
know that monetary policy does influence real economic aggregates, but we don’t 
always know how exactly (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
Policy makers typically have two major tools for economic control at their disposal: 
fiscal and monetary policy. Fiscal policy has never been consistenly viewed as a reliable 
variable for macroeconomic stabilization (Mishra, Montiel, and Spilimbergo, 2010). 
The fiscal channel often operates slowly, inefficiently, and usually aggrevates situations 
by acting as a pro-cyclical catalyst of any exogenous shock. It’s not to say that the fiscal 
arm is completely useless, but fiscal policy must be almost universally accompanied by 
a credible and congruent stance from the national central bank. In short, much due 
to the imperfections associated with the fiscal dimension of policy making, monetary 
policy often takes on the lead role in economic stabilization and control.
It has become conventional to believe that monetary policy indeed affects lives of 
economic agents, although sometimes in an undirect way (Mishkin, 1996). The 
transmission channels through which monetary policy is conducted are often 
subtle and complex. While the aim has always been to target a real variable such as 
aggregate output or employment, the selection of the correct channel of monetary 
transmission in order to execute the desired plan is often impeded by the structural 
issues of a given economy’s internal context. The story of the channels of monetary 
transmission, although without doubt built upon certain fundamental theoretical 
blocs, is an empirical issue. The workings of each monetary transmission channel 
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(and there are several of them) depend on a plethora of factors, ranging from the 
overall stage of macroeconomic development to the nuances of micro-structures of 
domestic financial markets (Checetti, 1999). Those factors differ tremendously in 
different regions and regimes of the world, thus necessisating differentiated and/or 
regional approaches to the study of monetary transmission channels.
Description of the Channels of Monetary Transmission
There are at least seven channels of monetary transmission that we can distinguish: 
interest rate channel, exchange rate channel, bank lending channel, balance 
sheet channel, asset price channel, monetary channel, and expectation channel. 
Empirically, it has been proven that the interest rate channel is the most dominant 
one for the case of developed economies with high-quality financial markets. In 
general, the interest channel is built on a Keynesian view that monetary policy can 
affect real costs of borrowing by changing nominal interest rates. Because prices are 
sticky and require time to adjust, nominal interest rate differentials transform into 
a corresponding adjustment in the real interest rate, which in turn affects spending 
and investment decisions in the economy.
Contrary to the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel is usually viewed 
as the most important monetary transmission channel in developing countries 
(Coricelli, Egert, and MacDonald, 2005). By performing direct interventions into 
the foreign exchange market, monetary policy makers can achieve a desirable level of 
the exchange rate. The exchange rate will in turn affect aggregate production via the 
current account channel, by influencing the costs of imported and exported goods 
and their relative price-based trade competitiveness. In addition, in countries where 
domestic agents tend to hold debt denominated in foreign currency (as is the case 
with most developing nations), exchange rate fluctuations can have a substantial 
effect on the agents’ debt portoflios and thus their overall balance sheets. Finally, 
particularly in developing and transmission economies, remittances (finances 
flowing from abroad) are usually the forgotten factor in the analysis of monetary 
transmission. In light of the inclusion of remittances into the picture, we believe 
that the exchange rate can carry an additional significant “wealth effect” on domestic 
aggregate demand via the flow of the typically dollar-denominated remitance.
The bank lending channel functions on the premise that there exists a pool of 
bank-dependent loan seekers, who wish to obtain funds for various investment 
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and consumption purposes. Monetary intervention can alter the the amount of 
bank reserves, thus changing the total amount of money that is available for banks 
to lend out. The restriction on the total amount of loanable funds in turn affects 
the potential of aggregate domestic investment and consumption. Of course, this 
channel operates with a strict assumption that borrowers do not have other sources 
of funding such as government bonds for bank credit (Walsh, 1998). 
The balance sheet channel is an extension of the bank lending channel, in which 
we assume that borrowers, in order to obtain credit funds from the bank, are forced 
to pay an interest-rate premium over the risk-free rate. That risk premium is based 
on the borrowers’ own balance sheet composition, such as a portfolio of securities 
on hand and real estate in possession (Mishkin, 2001). Monetary policy is able to 
affect the prices on the real estate market and/or the prices of stocks via open-market 
interventions targeting the interest rate. This way a monetary policy move can affect 
the borrower’s collateral potential, and thus the overall quantity of credit that banks 
will be willing to lend out against that collateral. Also, from the point of view of 
Modigliani’s life cycle hypothesis, monetary policy can affect aggregate domestic 
consumption through the prism of financial wealth of domestic constituents, which 
is in turn governed by the interest rate dynamics and arbitrage.
The asset price channel, similar in its logical foundations to the balance sheet channel, 
allows monetary policy makers to affect the total wealth of domestic economic 
agents. Agents, in turn, are able to adjust their purchasing and saving decisions 
according to their changing wealth holdings. This idea can be applied to firm-level 
investment and to the real estate market. The asset price channel matters only if 
the non-bank financial sector is considerably developed, and if market financing is 
reasonably important on the macro-scale (Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier, 2006).
The monetary channel is not a traditional inclusion into the discussion on channels 
of monetary transmission. We found that there was a gap in the classifications of the 
channels since neither the monetary base nor the domestic wage level are consistently 
included into the analysis. The former aggregate is usually viewed as an indirect 
measure of monetary policy. National banks rarely target monetary base as an end 
goal, but rather tweak money supply in order to achieve the desired break-even 
interest rate via open-market operations. Still, broad money should be perceived as 
an indirect predictor of real economy variables, or at least theoretically. Whether this 
is the case empirically for the CIS region we will discover later in the paper.
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Wages, or more concretely – the growth rate of wages – represents the cost, or the 
supply side of the nominal economy. We acknowledge the fact that neither the 
minimum wage nor the nation-wise growth rate of the wages is typically in the 
hands of monetary policy makers. However, it’s important to keep wages in the list 
of potential determinants of inflation and aggregate output more as a representative 
measure of the supply side of the economy, something which will make our analysis 
more complete.
Wages, broad monetary base, and remittances are the variables not always considered 
in empirical investigations of the monetary transmission channels. We believe that 
these three variables will add some originality in the perspective on the traditional 
approach to monetary transmission literature. Overall, we will analyze 4 channels of 
monetary transmission in this study: exchange rate channel, interest rate channel, 
bank lending channel, and the monetary channel. Detailed description of the 
variables used in each channel is available in Section 3.1.
The Case of CIS
After the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, hundreds of millions of 
people were left very much in chaos and disorder on all levels of governance. In 
order to preserve the unity that existed in the Soviet times, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States was established by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and the 
supranational organization now includes 10 official and 1 unofficial member. It 
is still unclear whether the CIS plays any effective role as a governing body on a 
daily basis and carries any significant impact on legislation and/or polit-economical 
directions of its constituents. However, member-states of this group do resemble 
each other in their dynamic of development and nation-building in the past 20 or 
so years, and thus it has become common to view CIS as a distinct economic unit.
One of the traits that is shared by most if not all of the CIS countries is the fragility 
of legislation and the rule of law, the decease that has plagued the region for much of 
its independent existence. Our interest lies in the economic and financial aspects of 
legal governance, and on that front, although much has indeed been accomplished 
(like the de juro sovereignty of the national banks), incomplete and outdated legal 
codes coupled with inefficient execution on the low and medium administrative 
levels contribute to an economic and financial environment without a solid, 
complete legal foundation.
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Furthermore, with the imperfections in legal governance of the financial sectors of 
CIS states naturally comes the problem of the large informal sectors of the economy. 
Corruption and the shadow economy are a problem for the CIS, but to be fair that is 
an ongoing issue for all developing economies and countries in transition of this world. 
With the presense of a large nformal economy, formal sources of funding like the ones 
which will be discussed in this paper lose their marginal superiority over the informal 
routes. As a result, channels of monetary transmission can not possible measure (at 
least not fully) the impact that the informal economy has on real macroeconomic 
aggreagates. This implies that some if not most of transmission channels are not 
operational in the CIS due to the presence of alternative and unregistered sources of 
funding. We can also not discard the importance of remittances that for some of the CIS 
member states are in the highest ranks in the world, such as Tajikistan and Armenia. 
Remittances are not necessarily illegal, but they do represent a somewhat informal 
channel of financing, and they are typically denominated in foreign currencies.
On the monetary front, CIS member-states almost uniformally confronted 
years of very high inflation (and some countries exhibited textbook examples of 
hyperinflation) following the Soviet Union breakdown. Inflation came as a result 
of two dominant factors. First, national governments in the CIS region were 
deeply in debt, with the obligations spiralling out of control. In order to finance 
the debt, national banks were required to effectively print more money and buy 
out those government debt obligations. This eventually debased national currencies, 
forcing some states to adobt fixed-exchange or semi-fixed currency regimes; either 
with respect to the American Dollar or to the Russian Ruble. The second factor 
which caused hyperinflation in the CIS was backward wage indexation which was 
unchanged since the Soviet era (Botric and Cota, 2006). Extremely rapid wage 
elevation and a poor system of managing that growth led to exploding incomes 
and opulence of money, which at the end of the day carried less and less marginal 
value. Hyperinflation, by and large, is an issue of the past for members of the CIS. 
However, certain countries like Belarus still have dangerously high inflation rates, 
ranging from 20 to 30% annualized.
Consequently, following the collapse of trust in national currencies due to 
hyperinflation and relative debasement, populations in the CIS began using foreign 
currencies such as the Dollar in their everyday operations. The famous notion of 
“dollarization” paralyzed monetary policy makers in the region, who were not able 
to effectively perform their duties due to the enormously large amount of foreign 
currency in domestic circulation. Dollarization is still a relevant problem for some 
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of the CIS members, however due to managed exchange rate regimes, monetary 
governing bodies have been considerably successful with stabilizing the system and 
enforcing monetary policy at least on some of the available channels.
Perhaps the most urgent of all problems for today that CIS countries are facing is the 
development of financial markets and the financial sector in general. On many layers, 
financial sector in the CIS is defficient and lagging behind not just the industrialzed 
states but also the developing countries in Eastern-Europe and Asia. First, the overall 
infrastructure of financial intermediation is in need of reform and strengthening. 
The overall levels of monetization and financial intermediation are low, which causes 
aggregate demand in CIS states to respond little to credit or deposit rates. Second, 
the region is very high in terms of quantities of foreign currency-denominated loans 
to the private sector. Thus, financing decisions are not affected to large extent by 
the interventions into domestic interest rate markets. Third, the banking sectors in 
almost all CIS states suffer from low levels of competion (consolidation of leading 
national commercial banks into groups of “Top-5” or alike).
It has also become common for many CIS commercial banks, and many economic 
agents in general for that matter, to obtain capital through external financing, thus 
leaving them indifirrent to the performance of domestic monetary and financial 
indicators. Further, the nonbank financial sectors are practically non-existant for 
most CIS states.  Absense of serious stock and debt markets, mortgage markets, 
insurance industries, hampers the the probability of either the asset price channel 
or the balance sheet channel to work appropriately. In addition, most if not all CIS 
countries must still address the issue of capital account liberalization, since capital 
mobility in certain countries of the region is considerably low (Jamilov, 2012). 
This is partially explained by active policies to prevent currency depreciations in 
the region (Keller, Richardson, 2003). Finally, qualitatively speaking, poor human 
capital expertise on the fronts of risk management, credit risk assessment, and 
accounting further influence the workings of monetary transmission channels in 
quite a negative way.
All in all, CIS is a region in transmission with its member-states showing signs of 
great resemblence, both in terms of historical development, and also in the types 
of problems that they are facing nowadays. Incomplete legislative foundations, 
informal sectors and shadow economies, dollarization, noncompetitiveness and 
consolidation in the banking sectors, capital account immobility, underdevelopment 
of the capital markets, and a growing need for transparent governance are among 
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the primary challenges for the CIS now and going forward. While analyzing the 
issue of monetary policy transmission in the CIS, we must look at the issue through 
the prism of the region’s peculiarites which were just mentioned. In light of these 
factors, we expect that the channels that we will measure (interest rate, exchange 
rate, bank lending, and monetary) will not always behave in a way that theory or 
evidence from industrialized states would predict. 
Indeed there have been many papers, both theoretical and empirical in nature, in 
the field of monetary policy transmission. There have been also some studies, both 
on individual country-basis and on the CIS as a group, on the channels of monetary 
transmission for the case of CIS. However, the originality of this paper is that 
nobody, to the best of our knowledge, has performed such a comprehensive country-
wise and regional analysis employing 3 distinct econometric methodologies. We will 
present the behavior of 4 channels of monetary transmission for 9 member states of 
the CIS over the period of 2000-2009. We will analyze the dynamics of monetary 
transmission channels in the short run using a VAR framework and in the long 
run using an ARDL approach to cointegration. And we will also provide evidence 
on how the CIS performs as a distinct unit via fixed effects panel-data analysis. In 
the end we will highlight the best and the worst performing channels of monetary 
transmission, and provide policy-relevant recommendations and conclusions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a review on the 
channels of monetary transmission literature. Section 3 describes the data and the 
countries used in our analysis, and lays out the econometric methods which were 
employed. Section 4 reports the short-run and long-run individual country as well 
as the CIS panel data results. Section 5 offers a discussion of our findings. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2011) suggest to categorize the monetary transmission 
channels into neoclassical and non-neoclassical groups. To the former category 
belongs the path that the interest rate takes to the real economy through investment 
and consumption. The non-neoclassical channels function through the change in 
the supply of credit and how the bank balance sheets respond to credit innovations. 
The relative efficiency of these two channels depends on the degree of development 
of the domestic financial system.
Channels of Monetary Transmission in the CIS: a Review
13Volume 3        Number 1        Spring 2013
Mishra, Montiel, and Spilimbergo (2010) provide arguments in favor of the bank 
lending channel as the prime route for monetary policymaking. They argue that apart 
from the bank lending channel, the interest rate channel, the asset channel, and the 
exchange rate channel are limited in their scope and ability by a set of negative factors: 
absense of well-functioning markets for fixed-income securities and equities, weak real 
estate markets, heavy central bank intervention in the foreign exchange markets, and 
by the very imperfect connections with the international capital markets. See (Keller, 
Richardson, 2003) for the discussion of exchange rate regimes in the CIS economies. 
In addition to the bank lending channel, the balance sheet channel is predicted to 
operate as a financial accelerator through the increased external finance premium.
Moreover, the bank lending channel is often regarded as the key channel of monetary 
transmission (Cetorelli and Godlberg, 2008). Presumably because banking is 
always among the largest non-energy sources of growth generation in developing 
economies, and also because banks are still the prime channel for obtaining funds. 
The channel tends to work differently for large and for small banks, with the 
difference typically rationalized by the higher substitutability of deposits as sources 
of funding for the larger institutions. Small banks, on the other hand, have a smaller 
chance of obtaining funds through alternative means. Thus, the bank lending 
channel operates in a discriminative manner with respect to size, balance-sheet wise. 
(Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000). With respect to the case of CIS, the a priori 
expectation on the working of the bank lending channel is ambivalent: on hand 
hand, the banking sectors in most CIS countries are considerably consolidated, so 
this particular channel of transmission should not work because of the presense of 
larger banks. In the meantime, it’s improbable that many banks in the CIS are global 
in nature, with most institutions holding assets either domestically or outside the 
country but still relativel close to the home region. The lack of a global nature of 
CIS banks therefore suggests that the bank lending channel should be operational 
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2008).
Further with regards to the bank lending channel, the path from monetary policy 
aggregates to the real economy lies through the availability and cost of bank credit. 
If the link between monetary policy interventions and the availability and the cost 
of credit is low, then the banking sector is not competitive enough and the real cost 
of bank lending is actually very high due to a poor institutional environment. If 
the link between the availability and the cost of credit and the real economy is low 
then the formal sector of the economy is too small. Note that both bank sector non-
competitiveness and the dominance of the informal financial sector are two factors 
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very much expected in the case of CIS. Therefore, it’s possible that the pass-through 
from monetary policy actions onto the real economy will be weak on both paths.
Kabundi and Nonhlanhla (2011) provide interesting evidence on the importance 
of the channel of confidence in the case of monetary transmission in South Africa. 
They built a Factor-Augmented Vector Auto Regression (FAVAR) framework and 
concluded that confidence in addition to the interest rate channel play the biggest 
role of explaining the real economy and prices. Also for South Africa, Ncube and 
Ndou (2011) claim that the wealth effect and the credit channel should be targeted 
for conducting anti-inflation policies.
Channels of monetary transmission should not be just operational on a technical 
side. They must also be controled by a credible monetary policy center. Mohanty 
and Turner (2008) argue that credibility and credible monetary policy frameworks 
are essential in strengthening the efficiency of the interest rate channel of monetary 
policy transmission in the emerging market economies (EMEs). Mukherjee and 
Bhattacharya (2011) conclude that for the case of EMEs, the interest rate channel 
impacts private consumption and investment. They also decomposed their results 
for the scenarios of with and without inflation targeting, and proved that presense 
of the inflation targeting regime does not alter the main conclusion.
Another work for the EMEs highlights the importance of having a developed 
domestic financial system (Bhattacharya, 2011). Weakness in the system coupled 
with a large informal sector in the economy leads to weak performance of the 
traditional channels of monetary transmission. In this paper, the most powerful 
transmission channel was found to be the exchange rate channel, while the interest 
rates had no significant impact on aggregate demand.
Dollarization in the context of monetary policy has been addressed in Acosta-
Ormaechea and Coble (2011). They argue that in Chile and New Zealand the 
traditional interest rate channel is more important, while in Peru and Uruguay the 
most significant channel is the exchange rate channel. Horvath and Maino (2006) 
believe that dollarization has a negative effect on the efficiency of the independent 
interest rate channel of monetary transmission.
Dollarization, as discussed in the previous section, is also a serious issue for the 
countries of the CIS. Korhonen and Wachtel (2005) claim that domestic prices 
reflect the changes in the exchange rate very quickly; in other words, the speed of 
adjustment to long-run equilibrium is fairly high. They argue that this signals the 
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high level of dollarization in most CIS countries. See (Balino, Bennet, Borensztein, 
1999) and (Sahay, Vegh, 1995) for the discussion of monetary policy in a highly-
dollarized economies.
Mohanty (2012) provide an extensive treatment of the monetary transmission 
channels for the case of India, but derive conclusions that are applicable to a much 
general pool of countries. Namely, they argue that deregulation of interest rates, 
government-led auction-based market borrowing programme, development of the 
short-term money markets, reduction in statutory reserve requirements, among 
other reforms have contributed to the development of the interest rate based 
indicrect instrument for monetary policy management.
Isakova (2008) conducted a VAR analysis for three Central Asian countries 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan). Results of this study show that 
policy rates passed through to money market interest rates without much trouble. 
However, inflation and aggregate output are not significantly affected by the 
innovations in the policy rates. They conclude that the bank lending channel is 
weak in the case of these three countries.
Dabla-Norris and Dloerkermeier (2006) analyzed the interest rate pass-through 
in Armenia and concluded that monetary policy rates transmitted well into the 
market interest rates. However, the market rates did not affect the real economy or 
price dynamics. Also for the case of Armenia, but with far-reaching implications 
for literature in general, Bordon and Weber (2010) decomposed the time series 
into two regimes, one with a highly dollarized economy and the other with a low 
degree of dollarization. They have demonstrated that dollarization negatively affects 
the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission, since policy rates did a 
far greater job of affecting inflation and output in a low-dollarization regime. Thus, 
for the traditional monetary transmission channels to work, it’s possible that the 
countries of the CIS will have to de-deollarize their domestic economies first.
Bakradze and Billmeier (2007) and Samkharadze (2008) show that aggregate output 
does not respond well to the innovations in the monetary policy variables in the case 
of Georgia. Similarly, inflation is also not affected by monetary policy shocks. The 
bank lending channel appears to be functioning in the correct manner, however 
bank interest rates do not impact aggregate output in a statistically significant way.
Agayev (2011) conducted a panel data analysis for 10 CIS countries in order to 
determine the factors which explain the region’s inflation dynamics. They found that 
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wages and exchange rate innovations do the best job of explaining inflation in the 
CIS in the long run. In the short run, however, changes in the bottom-line monetary 
base is the best explanating factor of price movements. Overall, the exchange rate 
and the monetary channels seemed to be the best at predicting inflation in the CIS.
With regards to methodologies used in monetary policy transmission studies, most 
have resolved to the traditional VAR framework (Sims, 1980; Blanchard and Quah, 
1989; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Cristiano and Eichenbaum, 1992). Others have 
used SVAR approaches (Aslanidi, 2007), and panel data structures (Agayev, 2011). 
A relatively novel method of studying the pass-through of monetary policy channels 
involves an ARDL approach to cointegration (Crespo-Cuaresma et.al., 2004). Some 
researches devised structural, DSGE-like models explaining macro-dynamics of 
countries involving numerous policy and market variables (Golinelli and Rovelli, 
2002). But all in all, VAR analysis seems to be the most preferred method for short-
run analysis, Vector Error Correction – VECM (if the variables are non-stationary) 
– for long-run investigations, ARDL for the case of variable stationarity (which 
is common for small samples), and panel fixed and random effects for a look at a 
group of several countries.
Mishkin (1996) presented an exhaustive explanation of all existing channels of 
monetary transmission. Egert and MacDonald (2006) provided an excellent 
literature review on many empirical studies on monetary transmission in developing 
economies.
Data Description and Econometric Methodology
Data Description
Annual data for the period of 2000-2009 was used for 9 countries of the CIS. 
Our data selection has been driven by the availability of reliable information 
for some members of the region. The data set for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Moldova, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine was compiled. 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been omitted due to data non-existence. 
For interpretation purposes, most series have been transformed using a natural 
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logarithm. Overall, data was obtained from such sources as CIS Stats, Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The World Bank, St. Louis 
Federal Reserve Bank, Statistical Offices and National Banks of the member states 
of the CIS. The variables were chosen with respect to their theoretical belonging 
to a particular channel of monetary transmission. For example, the refinance rate 
is part of the interest rate channel analysis, while remittances are included into the 
exchange rate channel discussion. Consult Table 1 below for a thorough description 
of the series used in this paper.
Table 1. Data Sources and Description
Indicator Source and Description Transmission Channel
Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Source: OECD, National Bureaus of Statistics; 
Format: Nominal, Annual Average; in %
Macro Variable
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Source: CIS Stats; Format: Nominal, Domestic 
Currency; LN Transformation
Macro Variable
Refinancing Rate (RR)
Source: OECD, National Central Banks; Format: 
6-month Rates, End-Year; in %
Interest Rate Channel
Federal Funds Rate (FFR)
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank Online 
Database; Format: Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate, 
nominal, End-Year; in %
Interest Rate Channel 
(Exogenous)
Lending Rate (LR)
Source: OECD, National Central Banks; Format: 
End-Year, Average Lending Rate; in %
Bank Lending Channel
Deposit Rate (DR)
Source: OECD, National Central Banks; Format: 
End-Year, Average Lending Rate; in %
Bank Lending Channel
Wage Growth Rate (WG)
Source: OECD, National Central Banks; Format: Gross 
Average Monthly Earnings, Percent Change; in %
Monetary Channel
Monetary Base (M2)
Source: CIS Stats; Format: Nominal, End-of-year, 
LN Transformation
Monetary Channel
Exchange Rate (ER)
Source: OECD; Format: Domestic Currency per 1 
US Dollar, End-of-Year, LN Transformation
Exchange Rate Channel
Remittances (REM)
Source: World Bank Remittances Factbook 2008, 
2011; Format: Total Inward Remittance Flow, in 
USD, Nominal, LN Transformation
Exchange Rate Channel 
(Exogenous)
Oil Prices (OILP)
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank Online 
Database; Format: Spot price per barrel, in USD, 
Annual-Average
Exchange Rate Channel 
(Exogenous)
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Econometric Methodology
Short-Run Analysis Using VAR
As noted in the previous section, we will use a VAR framework to demonstrate the 
short-dynamics of the responses of our macroeconomic variables (CPI and GDP) to 
innovations in the various policy variables.
A VAR in the level form will be estimated ala Jamilov (2011). The VAR system in 
this paper will take the following form:
 
where, Z is a vector of n variables, X – vector of deterministic variables;  – vector 
of innovations. For example, if we want to build a VAR model for the interest rate 
channel of Ukraine, we will use GDP, CPI, and the refinancing rate of Ukraine as 
endogenous variables, with the addition of the federal funds rate as a deterministic 
exogenous variable, plus the constant and the error term. In similar fashion, we will 
build VARs for all 9 countries and for each of the 4 channels of monetary transmission.
The preliminary VARs are required to determine the correct number of lags in the 
model, to ensure that there is no autocorrelation in the error terms, and that the 
residuals follow the pattern of a normal distribution. With the right number of lags, 
we construct the final VAR model in order to get impulse response functions and 
variance decompositions of the variables of interest.  
In the preliminary stage, a set of unit-root tests must be carried out to ensure that 
variables in our models have unit roots. Should a variable have a unit root in the 
level form, stationarity is obtained usually by first-differencing. If variables are non-
stationary, then we will achieve a long-run equilibrating equation by constructing a 
traditional Vector Error Correction model (VEC). Otherwise, we will have to adopt 
an Auto Regressive Distributed Lag model (ARDL) approach to cointegration, since 
this method doesn’t require the variables to be non-stationary in level form.
As a brief theoretical note, a one-time movement in a policy variable will affect not 
only the real economic aggregates but also the future values of the policy variables 
Zt = A1Zt 1 +A 2Zt 2 + +A nZt n +B Xt + t  
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via the so-called feedback effect. It is important to account for these feedback effects 
if we want to estimate the monetary transmission models correctly. Therefore, an 
econometric method of vector auto regressions (VAR), not a conventional Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) framework, should be employed. A VAR model and impulse 
response functions would take the feedback effects into account.
Overall, we have 9 member-states of the CIS, 4 channels of monetary transmission, 
with 2 macro variables (CPI and GDP) and at least 1 and sometimes more policy 
variables in every channel. We will also use the federal funds rate, oil prices, and 
remittance flows as exogenous variables in certain VAR set-ups. In total, we have 
run 36 VAR models in order to obtain short-run coefficients for each country and 
for each channel of monetary transmission.
Long-Run Analysis Using ARDL
There are several reasons why we have decided to use the ARDL approach to 
cointegration (developed by Pesaran et al., 2001) as opposed to the more common 
VECM to study the long-run behavior of monetary policy transmission channels. 
First, this method solves the problem of variable endogeneity and the inability to 
test hypotheses on the estimated coefficients. Second, ARDL is far more superior 
than multivariate coointegration methods in the case of small samples, which is 
important in our case (Narayan, 2005). Second, ARDL models do not require the 
regressors to be non-stationary, and most of our variables will be indeed stationary 
in level form. 
We now present how one of our channels of monetary transmission (we will use 
the example of the interest rate channel) would be represented in the ARDL form:
ܩܦ ௜ܲǡ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ σ Įଵ୧ǻ  ܩܦ ௜ܲǡ௧ି௝௠௝ୀଵ ൅σ Įଶ୧ǻܴܴ௜ǡ௧ି௝௠௝ୀ଴ ൅ σ Įଷ୧ǻܨܨܴ௧ି௝௠௝ୀ଴ ൅ Įସ  ܩܦ ௜ܲǡ௧ିଵ ൅ Įହܴܴௗǡ௧ିଵ ൅
Į଺ܨܨ ௙ܴǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߥ௧ (2) 
where m means lag length, lnGDPi,t is the ln-transformed GDP of country i at time 
t, RR is the refinancing rate of country i and time t, and FFR is the US Federal 
Funds Rate. Similarly, we could have built an ARDL representation for CPI with 
the RR and FFR as model variables. Altogether, we will build 2 long-run models 
for each macro variable (GDP and CPI), for each country (9 CIS member states), 
for each channel of monetary transmission (4 channels). Overall, we have run 72 
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ARDL regressions in order to achieve long-run coefficients for each country and for 
each channel of monetary transmission.
As noted above, it is not necessary to test our variables for unit root processes. Instead, 
we can proceed with testing for cointegration. The ARDL approach achieves this 
by presenting an F-statistic which tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration (H0: 
b5=b6=b7=b8=0) against the alternative hypothesis (H1: b5≠0, b6≠0, b7≠0, b8≠0). For 
every significance level there are two sets of critical values. If the F-statistic exceeds 
the upper-bound critical value, then the null hypothesis is rejected. If the F-statistic 
is below the lower-bound, then the null is accepted and we have no cointegration. 
Finally, if the F-statistic is between the two bounds then the test has no conclusive 
result. There is another way of testing for cointegration, which is looking at the error 
correction term in the ARDL’s short-run representation (Kremers et al., 1992). If 
the error correction term is statistically significant and negative, it implies that the 
variables are quick on approaching their long-run stabilizing conditions.
Panel-Data Analysis Using Panel Fixed Effects
Apart from attempting to investigate the channels of monetary transmission on 
individual-country basis, we have also devised a panel set-up for the period of 2000-
2009, consisting of our 9 member-states of the CIS. We wish to find out how the CIS 
performs as a region with regards to monetary transmission. First, we have to test our 
panel data for the presence of a unit root. We will achieve this by running the Levin, Lin, 
and Chu (LLC, 2002) panel unit root test. This test is different from the individual unit 
root testing that we proposed in section 3.2.1. on individual-country VAR modeling. 
If variables in our panel set-up are non-stationary, then we will have to resort to 
advanced panel cointegration techniques for non-stationary data. Otherwise, we 
will employ a long-run panel fixed-effects model of the following form:
lnGDPit= Įit + ȕ1,itRRit + ȕ2,itLRit + ȕ3,itDRit + ȕ4,itWGit + ȕ5,itlnM2it + ȕ6,itlnERit + ȕ7,itlnREMit + uit  (3) 
Consider that in a similar fashion we will devise the panel fixed-effects regression for 
inflation, with CPI as a dependent variable. Note that for the regression of CPI we 
will also add CPI(-1) – the lag of inflation, which will represent inflation inertia, to 
the list of independent variables. Overall, there will be 2 panel fixed effects regressions, 
for each of the two macroeconomic variables (GDP and CPI), which will determine 
which of the variables is best at explaining inflation and output in the CIS.
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Results
Short-run Results for Individual Countries
We begin to present our short-run individual country results based on the VAR 
models. All the impulse response functions are available in the Appendix. Note that 
in our VAR set-up, the Federal Funds Rate (FFR), oil price (OILP), and remittances 
(REM) are treated as purely exogenous. Thus, an IRF representation for them will 
not be possible. Also consider that our small sample size limits the interpretational 
importance of the 5% statistical significance. Some of the responses will indeed be 
significant for several periods, and it will add more robustness for inference, but 
we are interested more in the general direction of each response and whether a 
given country will demonstrate any systematic evidence for efficiency in a particular 
transmission channel
Interest Rate Channel
Short-run individual country evidence for the interest rate channel is reported in the 
Figures 1 through 9. The primary policy variable for this channel is the refinancing 
rate. The US federal funds rate was taken as an exogenous variable. GDP and CPI 
are the macroeconomic aggregates by default.
The response of aggregate output to innovations in the refinancing rate in the case 
of Armenia is strongly negative and statistically significant up to the 6th period 
(Figure 1). Armenian GDP declines following a one standard deviation increase 
in the country’s refinancing rate, which suggests that the interest rate channel is 
operational. The effect of the refinancing rate on inflation is almost negligible and 
not significant. For Azerbaijan, both GDP and CPI do not seem to be responding in 
a noticeable manner to refinancing rate innovations (Figure 2). The same conclusion 
could be applied to Belarus: there is no evidence that the interest rate channel is 
effective (Figure 3).
For Kazakhstan, the path of the response of both output and prices to the refinancing 
rate is highly unstable, although GDP seems to demonstrate the presence of a 
price effect in the short run as output rises slightly, but then falls until its long-run 
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equilibrium below the pre-innovation level (Figure 4). Again, the dynamic is too 
unstable. For Kyrgyzstan, inflation shows behavior similar to the case of Kazakh 
CPI: unstable and insignificant (Figure 5). However, output seems to be increasing 
following a positive innovation in the refinancing rate, which is surprising from the 
theoretical point of view.
CPI of Moldova has a significant positive response to the refinancing rate up to 
the 2nd period (Figure 6). Moldavian GDP, similarly to the case of Kazakh GDP, 
increases slightly following an intervention into the refinancing rate market. 
For Russia, although the effect is not significant, the refinancing rate carries a 
theoretically correct effect on aggregate output, since it declines when the interest 
rate is raised (Figure 7). Russian CPI movement is correlated with the direction of 
refinancing rate innovations, although in a very insignificant manner. For Tajikistan 
and Ukraine, we cannot detect any noticeable trend in the response of either output 
or inflation to the refinancing rate (Figure 8 and 9).
Overall, only for the cases of Armenia and Russia, domestic output seems to be 
determined by fluctuations in the refinancing rate. Inflation in none of the CIS 
states, according to our calculations, can be managed via the interest rate channel.
Figure 1. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Armenia
Figure 2. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Azerbaijan
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Figure 3. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Belarus
Figure 4. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Kazakhstan
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Figure 5. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Kyrgyzstan
Figure 6. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Moldova
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Figure 7. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Russia
Figure 8. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Tajikistan
 
Figure 9. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Refinancing Rate – Ukraine
Channels of Monetary Transmission in the CIS: a Review
25Volume 3        Number 1        Spring 2013
Exchange Rate Channel
Short-run individual country results for the exchange rate channel are presented 
in the Figures 10 through 18. The primary policy variable for this channel is the 
exchange rate between the national currency and the US dollar. Remittances and 
price of oil were selected as exogenous variables. Again, GDP and CPI are indicators 
of the broad macro-economy.
Armenian GDP responds positively and significantly to an innovation in the 
national exchange rate up to the 5th period (Figure 10). Inflation on the other hand 
seems to be unresponsive to the exchange rate fluctuations. In case of Azerbaijan, 
aggregate output rises as the exchange rate depreciates for one standard deviation; 
domestic prices do not react in any noticeable way (Figure 11).
Belarusian domestic aggregate output shows a slight short-run hike following an 
exchange rate devaluation, while inflation suffers a temporary decline (Figure 12). 
Both variables return to their pre-depreciation levels by the 4th period. GDP and CPI 
of Kazakhstan are not responsive to the country’s exchange rate movements (Figure 
13). Domestic output of Kyrgyzstan is equally unaffected by the ER innovations; the 
Kyrgyz inflation, however, rises slightly due to one standard deviation depreciation 
(Figure 14).
In the case of Moldova, both aggregate output and inflation exhibit a significant 
positive short-run response to a depreciation of the Leu (Figure 15). Interestingly, 
after several periods inflation declines and even falls below the pre-devaluation 
level. GDP of Russia increases following a currency devaluation, and the effect is 
significant for 3 periods. Russian CPI falls in response to the depreciation, also in a 
significant way up to the 2nd period (Figure 16).
Tajikistani GDP does not seem to be responsive to domestic exchange rate 
innovations (Figure 17). Inflation, however, has a significant negative short-run 
response to a one standard deviation fall in value of the somoni. In the long run, the 
exchange rate remains practically unchanged and returns to the initial equilibrium. 
For Ukraine, neither GDP nor CPI react in any substantial way to interventions 
into the exchange rate.
Overall, the exchange rate channel of monetary transmission, according to our 
calculations, is visibly operational in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Certain 
degrees of effectiveness are observed in Russia and Belarus.
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Figure 10. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Armenia
Figure 11. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Azerbaijan
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Figure 12. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Belarus
Figure 13. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Kazakhstan
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Figure 14. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Kyrgyzstan
Figure 15. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Moldova
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Figure 16. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Russia
Figure 17. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Tajikistan
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Figure 18. Response of GDP and CPI to 
Exchange Rate – Ukraine
 
Monetary Channel
Short-run individual country results for the monetary channel are available in the 
Appendix under Figures 19 through 27. GDP and CPI are the default indicators of 
domestic demand and inflation respectively. M2 and WG are the policy variables 
of the domestic supply of broad money and the average annualized growth rate of 
nominal wages, respectively. 
Armenian GDP shows a positive response to an increase in wages, but not to M2. 
The effect is not statistically significant though (Figure 19). Inflation does not seem 
to be affected by WG, while for M2 the dynamic is too unstable and inconclusive, 
although there is a statistically significant price spike in the short run following the 
increase in the monetary base. For the case of Azerbaijan, neither wages nor money 
seem to be effective at influencing GDP or inflation (Figure 20).
Gross Domestic Product of Belarus displays a significant positive response up to the 
4th period to an increase in M2 (Figure 21). M2 has a negative but a non-significant 
effect on inflation. With regards to wages, a one standard deviation increase in WG 
has a stably negative effect on output but a positive short-run effect on inflation. 
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Both effects are insignificant. For Kazakhstan, domestic output and inflation both 
increase in the short run due to an impulse of wage growth (Figure 22). Broad 
money supply has no effect on either Kazakh GDP or prices.
Wages carry a positive, although insignificant, impact on Kyrgyz GDP; the response 
of inflation is too unstable (Figure 23). M2 has no effect whatsoever on output or 
inflation. In the case of Moldova, an increase in M2 has a light positive effect on 
domestic production and no seemingly meaningful effect on prices (Figure 24). 
Wages cause no response from the dynamic of Moldavian GDP, although they 
initiate a decline in inflation in the short run and then a slight recovery. Neither 
effect is statistically significant, even at the 10% level.
For Russia, broad money does a poor job of affecting either GDP or CPI (Figure 
25). Wages, on the other hand, have a significant positive effect on output in the 
short run (peculiar form of a price effect), which is followed by a long-run decline. 
Inflation follows a similar path: rising in the short run due to an increase in nominal 
wage growth, and falling after several periods. Tajikistani WG has a negative effect 
on inflation and on GDP. In the case of inflation, the impact is particularly strong 
and statistically significant for 2 periods. Both GDP and M2 increase slightly due 
to an expansion in the monetary base, although in an insignificant manner (Figure 
26). For the case of Ukraine, M2 has no effect at all on domestic GDP and CPI. 
Wages carry a positive effect on aggregate output for all periods, while for inflation 
the effect is negative in the short run and positive after the 5th period.
All in all, for almost every country of the CIS either broad money or nominal wage 
growth can explain at least one of our two macro variables. In general, output has 
shown more sensitivity to monetary variable innovations than inflation.
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Figure 19. Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Armenia
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Figure 20. Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Azerbaijan
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Figure 21. Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Belarus
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Figure 22. Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Kazakhstan
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Figure 23. Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Kyrgyzstan
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Figure 24 Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Moldova
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Figure 25. Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Russia
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Figure 26. Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Tajikistan
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Figure 27. Response of GDP and CPI to Wages and M2 – Ukraine
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Bank Lending Channel
Short-run individual country results for the bank lending channel are available in 
the Appendix under Figures 28 through 36. For the bank lending channel, which 
according to many theoretical and empirical papers on monetary transmission in 
developing economies, should be an efficient and relevant channel, we are using the 
deposit interest rate and the lending interest rate as main policy variables. GDP and 
CPI are once again taken as indicators of the overall macroeconomic environment.
For Armenia, the lending rate has no impact on either GDP or CPI (Figure 28). 
However, output shows a considerably negative, and almost completely significant up 
to the 6th period, response to a one standard deviation increase in domestic deposit 
rates. Inflation initially rises but then falls following an innovation in the interest rates 
on deposits.  For Azerbaijan, there is no visible effect of either deposit or credit interest 
rates on both output and prices (Figure 29). In the case of Belarus, domestic inflation 
increases following a hike in the deposit interest rates, and the effect is significant for 
2 periods (Figure 30). Prices are not affected by the credit rates, and Belarusian output 
does not react to either lending or deposit rates of interest. In Kazakhstan, the bank 
lending channel doesn’t exhibit any sign of efficiency, as neither deposit nor lending 
interest rates affect GDP or inflation in any way (Figure 31.
For Kyrgyzstan, the bank lending channel does not present any evidence for 
functionality (Figure 32). In the case of Moldova, output responds in a negative way 
to an increase in domestic deposit rates (Figure 33). The effect is not significant, but 
considerable. No impact is observed on GDP from the impulse to LR. Inflation is 
not affected by the lending rates, while the effect from deposit rates is dual: falling 
inflation in the short run, and then recovery in the medium-long run. There is no clear 
trend and the dynamic is very unstable and follows a cyclical/sinusoidal trajectory.
Innovations in Russian domestic deposit and lending interest rates both negatively 
affect the country’s GDP, and in a statistically significant way up to the 4th period 
(Figure 34). The bank lending channel is extremely homogenous for Russia, since 
interest rates on credit and deposit affect the real economy in much the same way. 
Inflation has a positive response to an increase in either lending or deposit rates. 
For Tajikistan, LR has no effect whatsoever on GDP or CPI (Figure 35). Rise in 
DR, however, has a visible short-run impact on output and prices. The dynamic 
afterwards is too unstable for any reasonable conclusion to be reached on the 
working of the channel in Tajikistan. Finally, neither lending nor deposit interest 
rates have any consistent effect on GDP and CPI in the case of Ukraine (Figure 36).
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All in all, according to our results, the bank lending channel seems to be operational 
in Armenia, Moldova, and Russia. Again we observe that output is much more 
flexible to policy innovations than is inflation.
Figure 28. Response of GDP and CPI to Deposit and Lending Interest Rates – Armenia
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Figure 29. Response of GDP and CPI Deposit and Lending Interest Rates– Azerbaijan
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Figure 30. Response of GDP and CPI to Deposit and Lending Interest Rates – Belarus
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Figure 31. Response of GDP and CPI Deposit and Lending Interest Rates– Kazakhstan
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Figure 32. Response of GDP and CPI to Deposit and Lending Interest Rates – Kyrgyzstan
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Figure 33. Response of GDP and CPI Deposit and Lending Interest Rates– Moldova
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Figure 34. Response of GDP and CPI to Deposit and Lending Interest Rates – Russia
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Figure 35. Response of GDP and CPI Deposit and Lending Interest Rates– Tajikistan
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Figure 36. Response of GDP and CPI to Deposit and Lending Interest Rates – Ukraine
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Long-Run Results for Individual Countries
We are now presenting results of our ARDL regressions to shed light on the long-
run behavior of the channels of monetary transmission in the case of our 9 CIS 
countries. Firstly, we note that all of our regressions are cointegrated according the 
bound testing procedure. F-test results are omitted for brevity but are available upon 
request. We have run all the regressions and summarized the results for each country 
in one single table (Table 2 in the Appendix). We have once again investigated 4 
channels of monetary transmission (interest rate channel, exchange rate channel, 
bank lending channel, and monetary channel) and used essentially the same variable 
set-ups as in the case of short-run VAR models presented in section 4.1. For example, 
we are still using the domestic refinancing rate as the prime policy variable in the 
interest rate channel, with the federal funds rate as the exogenous variable. Note 
that for the exchange rate channel, in addition to the exchange rate variable itself, 
we will also present for the first time quantitative evidence for using remittances as 
a channel of transmission.
For Armenia, the only channel which seems to operate in the long run is the 
monetary channel, through which both M2 and WG significantly affect the nation’s 
aggregate output. No other effect is significant. Belarus demonstrates a high level of 
long-run workability in the bank lending channel. However, only the effect from 
the lending rate is negative, which is the theoretically correct response to a spike in 
interest rates. In addition, M2 has a positive significant effect on Belarusian GDP, 
and CPI is positively affected by innovations in the refinancing rate.
From Table 2 in the Appendix, we see that flow of remittance has a considerable and 
positive impact on both GDP and CPI of Azerbaijan in the long run. Monetary base 
(M2) positively and significantly affects the country’s GDP, while an increase in the 
refinancing rate creates a significant positive response in the CPI. No other variables 
present statistically significant outcomes.
For Kazakhstan, the monetary channel seems to be the most important channel 
of transmission in the long run. CPI is affected both by wage growth and by the 
monetary base, and in a statistically significant way. GDP is also affected by the 
M2. Similarly to the case of Azerbaijan and Belarus, Kazakh inflation responds in 
a positive significant manner to innovations in the refinancing rate. Kyrgyzstan 
exhibits a strong monetary channel, since its domestic output is affected in a 
significant way by the broad money supply, and CPI responds in a positive and 
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significant way to a rise in the nominal wage growth rate. Also, flow of remittance 
has a negative significant effect on Kyrgyz CPI.
Moldovan CPI can only be influenced in a significant way by raising the domestic 
exchange rate. GDP, however, is sensitive both to the bank lending and to the 
monetary channels. Increases in either M2 or WG carry a significant positive effect 
on Moldova’s GDP, and so does the deposit interest rate. Lending interest rates 
negatively affect GDP in the long run, which unlike the sign of the deposit rate 
impact, is the theoretically correct outcome.
For Russia, all channels of monetary transmission show some degree of workability in 
the long run. First, domestic refinancing rate affects GDP and CPI in a negative and 
in a positive way respectively. Second, lending interest rates have a significant negative 
effect on GDP, and a significant positive effect on CPI. In response to an increase in 
domestic deposit rates, Russian CPI declines. GDP also responds in a statistically 
significant way to an increase in M2. Inflation is highly responsive both to variations 
in the exchange rate of the Ruble, and to the flow of remittance from abroad.
Tajikistan shows signs of a working exchange rate channel in the long run, as the 
exchange rate of Somoni affects both the Tajik GDP and CPI. Remittances and 
domestic interest rates on deposit both explain inflation, and cause its decline in 
the long run. Finally, for the case of Ukraine, the refinancing rate has a positive 
significant effect on both output and inflation.  So does the broad money base, as 
GDP and CPI increase in the long run following an impulse from M2. CPI can also 
be influenced by varying either interest rates on deposits or the domestic exchange 
rate, since both variables carry a significant positive effect on domestic price level.
By and large, long-run GDP of all CIS countries is responsive to innovations in the 
broad supply of money (M2). All 9 cases show that M2 positively affects GDP in the 
long run. For inflation the situation is different, as there is no universal conclusion. 
For some cases, CPI is driven by the exchange rate, for others – by the refinancing 
rate or the deposit interest rates. Consistent with our finding in Section 4.1, output 
is a lot more responsive to variations in policy variables than is inflation, suggesting 
that both in the short run and in the long run inflation cannot be systematically 
affected, or explained for that matter, in the region of CIS. Remittance, our original 
addition to the traditional discussion of monetary transmission channels, affects 
long-run inflation in a statistically significant way in 4 of 9 cases, and output only 
for the case of Azerbaijan.
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Table 2. Long-run ARDL Estimates of the Channels of Monetary 
Transmission in individual CIS countries
Dependent 
Variable
Interest 
Channel
Banking Channel Monetary Channel Exchange Rate Channel
RR LR DR M2 WG ER REM
Armenia
GDP -0.03241 -0.10789 0.003136 0.49321 0.012336 -6.7442 1.1154
CPI -0.13305 0.029878 -0.27944 1.1926 0.10831 9.2648 -0.67652
Azerbaijan
GDP -1.0749 0.32143 -0.086 0.77205 -0.02417 -0.77127 0.42941
CPI 4.2079 1.5718 0.091337 4.2565 -10.3781 -0.12487 1.5576
Belarus
GDP 0.027193 -0.2526 0.33208 0.61478 0.004057 0.91783 0.08743
CPI 1.0724 -2.5356 5.1889 -10.7729 0.16538 -3.4737 -1.7363
Kazakhstan
GDP 0.12968 -0.1591 0.018284 0.60873 0.005028 -12.2264 -1.2213
CPI 2.8766 2.135 -0.40912 1.4938 0.53666 -19.9 -27.925
Kyrgyzstan
GDP -0.20092 0.090923 -0.23863 0.41251 0.028863 8.5998 3.5021
CPI 1.998 -0.31599 -0.01535 2.2517 0.75434 12.5628 -4.1365
Moldova
GDP 0.12351 -0.6562 0.17436 0.68782 0.013584 5.1249 -0.16673
CPI 1.2194 -10.9836 1.9765 1.2155 -0.31324 8.1786 0.16672
Russia
GDP -0.08053 -0.16297 0.10564 0.66078 0.001362 2.055 0.44869
CPI 0.64986 1.661 -1.1322 -1.7035 0.27264 -6.7306 -11.3705
Tajikistan
GDP -0.39436 -0.37563 -0.39966 0.63523 0.030577 5.4776 -0.10471
CPI 1.5514 -1.3845 -2.2224 4.7645 0.15076 10.9657 -15.8348
Ukraine
GDP 0.19143 0.12031 1.8635 0.70479 0.018636 -29.7124 -9.598
CPI 3.4232 -0.60575 2.3894 14.4865 -0.70358 35.0952 4.5702
Note: RR – refinancing rate, LR – lending rate, DR – deposit rate, M2 – broad monetary base, WG – annual wage 
growth, ER – exchange rate, REM – remittances. Bold formatting indicates statistical significance of the coefficient 
at the 5% level. For example, the impact of the refinancing rate on the CPI of Azerbaijan is 4.2079: statistically 
significant at the 5% level.
Panel Results for CIS as a Group
We conclude our presentation of results by reporting the outcome from our panel 
fixed effects analysis of the CIS as a distinct group. All our variables are non-
stationary of order I(1) according to our panel unit root test results, which are 
omitted for brevity. We have run 2 equations for our panel: one with GDP and 
Emin HUSEYNOV / Rustam JAMILOV
52 Journal of Economic and Social Studies
the other with CPI as dependent variable. For the CPI regression we are adding an 
additional variable of CPI(-1), which is the lag of inflation, to check on inflation 
inertia in the CIS. Table 3 has the outcome of the GDP regression, and Table reports 
the numbers for the CPI model.
For CIS as a whole, output is influenced only by the fluctuations in the exchange 
rates and by the movements in the monetary base. None of our interest rate variables, 
nor the wage growth rate or flow of remittance has a significant effect on GDP. In 
essence, these panel results are consistent with what we achieved for the individual 
country long-run estimations in Section 4.2: M2 seems to have a strong impact over 
production and output in the CIS in the long run.
For the CPI regression, we conclude that the refinancing rate, nominal wage growth 
rate, and the flow of remittance carry statistically significant effects on long run 
regional inflation. Again, this outcome is similar to our conclusion following the 
analysis in Section 4.2: individual country results also confirmed that remittances 
and refinancing rate are good predictors of price fluctuations in the long run. Note 
that, although inflation does have inertia, the effect is not statistically significant. 
Also an interesting observation is that all interest rate variables affect the region-wise 
inflation in a positive way, whereas theory would predict CPI to be inversely related 
to interest rates.
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Table 3. Panel Fixed Effects Estimates for the GDP Determinants in the CIS
Dependent Variable: LN_GDP
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample: 2000 2009
Cross-sections included: 7
Total panel (balanced) observations: 70
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 2.473668 0.455185 5.434422 0.0000
LN_ER 0.390588 0.106693 3.660861 0.0006
LN_M2 0.659864 0.014310 46.11061 0.0000
WG -0.000358 0.000793 -0.451608 0.6533
DR -0.001239 0.004514 -0.274427 0.7848
LR 0.008848 0.005782 1.530349 0.1316
RR -0.003931 0.003813 -1.030912 0.3070
LN_REM 0.013141 0.014203 0.925220 0.3588
Eﬀects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.998682    Mean dependent var 8.797067
Adjusted R-squared 0.998376    S.D. dependent var 2.057362
S.E. of regression 0.082903    Akaike info criterion -1.965434
Sum squared resid 0.384883    Schwarz criterion -1.515735
Log likelihood 82.79019    F-statistic 3264.478
Durbin-Watson stat 1.979005    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Note: RR- refinancing rate; DR – deposit rate; LR – lending rate; WG – nominal wage growth rate; ER – exchange 
rate vis-à-vis US Dollar; M2 – monetary base; REM –flow of remittances in USD.
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Table 4. Panel Fixed Effects Estimates for the Inflation Determinants in the CIS
Dependent Variable: CPI
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2009
Cross-sections included: 7
Total panel (balanced) observations: 63
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -41.15838 21.20753 -1.940743 0.0582
CPI1 0.036606 0.046927 0.780072 0.4392
RR 0.699298 0.127161 5.499297 0.0000
DR 0.266550 0.288744 0.923137 0.3606
LR 0.075246 0.231706 0.324748 0.7468
WG 0.202738 0.056461 3.590758 0.0008
LN_ER 3.030569 4.244551 0.713991 0.4787
LN_M2 1.287421 0.806225 1.596851 0.1169
LN_REM 2.040335 0.790227 2.581962 0.0129
Eﬀects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared 0.926820    Mean dependent var 10.56206
Adjusted R-squared 0.905476    S.D. dependent var 9.687898
S.E. of regression 2.978514    Akaike info criterion 5.224983
Sum squared resid 425.8343    Schwarz criterion 5.735253
Log likelihood -149.5870    F-statistic 43.42291
Durbin-Watson stat 2.200179    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Note: CPI1 indicates inflation inertia, i.e. the lag of CPI(-1); RR- refinancing rate; DR – deposit rate; LR – lending 
rate; WG – nominal wage growth rate; LN_ER – natural log of the exchange rate vis-à-vis US Dollar; LN_M2 – 
natural log of the broad monetary base; LN_REM – natural log of the flow of remittances in USD.
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Discussion
We have achieved much heterogeneity for our short-run results: some countries 
of the CIS show strength virtually in all channels of monetary transmission, while 
others are effective just in one of the channels. In the long run, we can confidently 
state that GDP is affected by the supply of money, in addition to some marginal 
influence from the exchange rate. CPI is driven mainly by the movement in the 
refinancing rates, flow of remittance, and to some extent by the exchange rates 
and wages. Countries do differ greatly in the relative efficiency of their respective 
domestic monetary policies. However, there are some unifying arguments such as 
the monetary base being a universally strong factor of GDP, or the refinancing rate 
and remittances being a good predictor of inflation. 
We have witnessed once again that the question of monetary transmission channels 
is indeed very empirical and contextual, and depends as much on the country 
of focus as it does on theoretical models and generalizations. We also prove that 
treating CIS as a region is reasonable, since our results from the CIS panel fixed 
effects regressions do coincide with the individual country based VAR model. Our 
results are, by and large, consistent with the findings of previous literature. Flow 
of remittance, our original introduction to the exchange rate channel of monetary 
transmission, proves to be an important factor for future studies.
Based on the results of this study and our survey of the practices, failures, and 
success stories in monetary policy-making of CIS states in the past 20 years, we wish 
to list once again the key directions for progress that this region needs to adopt to 
ensure continuous development of the region’s channels of monetary transmission.
 Use short-term policy interest rates. Based on the success stories of CIS states 
with very efficient interest rate channels of monetary transmission, it is desirable 
that CIS countries, and indeed all developing economies, would focus on policies 
affecting short-term policy interest rates, e.g. overnight repo rates. The shorter the 
duration of those rates, the more influential the channel becomes and the easier 
it is for policy makers to quickly and correctly influence market interest rates.
 Adopt inflation-targeting regimes. Although not exactly at the hyperinflation 
levels of early-mid 1990s, inflation rates in some CIS states are still structurally 
very high, especially when comparing with the developing parts of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Strategic shifts towards inflation targeting policy regimes would 
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serve a dual benevolent purpose for policy makers: it would not only drag the 
core inflation rate down, but also improve the overall working capacity of the 
channel of transmission.
 De-dollarize the economy. High degrees of dollarization do not allow monetary 
policy interventions to affect domestic market variables up to a satisfactory 
level. Elevation of trust into the purchasing strength of the domestic currency, 
credibility of the national money issuer (i.e. central bank), transparent and 
credible expectations on future monetary policy stances are all important factors 
that contribute to the rebalancing of the population’s currency portfolio holdings 
towards the local currency and away from the foreign currency anchor.
 Increase risk-premium for external financing. The vice of all interest rate 
channels of monetary transmission is the ease of obtaining funds from the sources 
alternative to the formal route. Policy makers should identify the dominant 
types of domestic informal financing, and attempt to raise the premium that 
fund-seekers should pay to get access to those informal finances; either through 
bureaucracy, a form of taxation and a mixture of financial incentives, or through 
legal enforcement.
 Minimize the informal sector and the shadow economy. Econometric models 
of monetary transmission channels cannot assess (not in full, at least) the workings 
of the informal sectors of the economy. Coupled with the efforts to increase 
risk-premium for external financing, policy makers need to either eradicate the 
shadow economy completely or to at least make it feasible and beneficial for the 
informal agents to shift their interests towards the formal (legal) sector. Shadow 
economy minimization is an age old struggle but the benefits, which at least 
include an improvement of the monetary transmission channels, are worth the 
continuous effort.
 Develop domestic capital markets and sources of non-bank financing. 
For better or for worse, banks are still the chief allocators of resources in most 
emerging economies, and certainly in the CIS. Formation of an optimal market 
for transference of funds from those with excess to those with deficit is paramount 
for fluidity and mobility of the whole financial sector. Much focus must be placed 
on the development of pension funds, markets for short-term governmental and 
non-governmental corporate bonds, markets for stocks and equity. Also important 
is to educate economic and financial agents about the value and advantages of 
non-bank sources of funding.
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 Increase competitiveness in domestic banking sectors. Precisely because the 
populations of transition economies do not have alternative ways of formal 
financing, the banking sectors typically become uncompetitive. A monopoly 
on resource provision leads both to sector consolidation and also to artificially 
high market interest rates. Although, typically by legal mandate, the national 
bank cannot influence market interest rates on deposit and/credit directly (it 
can achieve this only indirectly though policy rate innovations), the government 
can limit bank mergers and acquisitions to protect the idea of an “optimal bank 
size”. It can also place interest rates on state-driven instruments (such as mortgage 
credit through the public/government channel) so low, that the bank-provided 
alternatives would seize to seem rational.
 Establish a solid, transparent financial governing framework. Much as a 
supporting caveat to the ongoing technical financial and monetary reform, CIS 
states must ensure that the region is governed by an easy-to-understand and 
robust legal foundation. Many countries in the CIS still do not have a modern 
law on mortgage lending, or are in need of an urgent and considerable pension 
reform. The problem is that the financial sector is developing quicker than the 
legal framework which supports it. Gaps and inefficiencies in the legal code create 
room for informal activities. It is necessary, however, to not overcomplicate legal 
procedures, which would have an adverse incentive effect such as the desire to 
circumvent complex requirements and seek an easier, once again an informal, 
way out. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to gather the efforts of decades of theoretical 
and empirical work on the channels of monetary transmission and produce 
a comprehensive review for the case of CIS. We have provided an extensive 
introduction and literature review which identified the most common transmission 
channels and their applicability to the CIS. In the stage of empirical analysis, we 
have studied both the short-run and the long-run performance of 4 channels of 
monetary transmission for 9 countries of the CIS. We have also looked at how the 
region performs as a distinct economic unit, having employed a panel data approach.
Emin HUSEYNOV / Rustam JAMILOV
58 Journal of Economic and Social Studies
We conclude that broad supply of money (M2) is the only consistent channel 
through which policy makers can affect aggregate output. Meanwhile, flow of 
remittance and domestic refinancing interest rate are the main factors and indicators 
of inflation. The exchange rate seems to be playing a supporting role, both for 
output and inflation determination. While it is clear that the sphere of the channels 
of monetary transmission is largely an empirical and contextual issue, we have also 
found that CIS does behave like an integral unit from this particular angle. 
Although the region has accomplished a lot in the past two decades, still many 
challenges remain until the local channels of transmission reach its optimal 
level of efficiency. Among others, development of capital markets and non-bank 
sources of financing, adoption of inflation targeting regimes, improvement of the 
legal framework, and placement of a larger emphasis on short-term interest rate 
management are the questions to address for CIS policy makers in the years to come.
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